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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health 
Clinic: BLOCKING ACCESS TO 
ABORTION CLINICS IS NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STAT-
UTE. 
In Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 
(1993), the United States Supreme 
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that ob-
structing a woman's access to an abor-
tion clinic does not give rise to a federal 
cause of action under 42 U.S.c. § 
1985(3) (1988). In so holding, the Court 
concluded that the goal of preventing 
abortions behind the demonstrations did 
not establish an invidious discrimina-
tory intent towards women in general, 
and the incidental effect of the demon-
strations on a woman's right to inter-
state travel was insufficient to establish 
a conspiracy to deprive women of their 
constitutionally protected right. More-
over, the Court concluded that prevent-
ing abortions did not constitute a purely 
private conspiracy. 
The Respondents (hereinafter 
"Pro-Choice") were abortion clinics 
and supporting organizations who 
sought to protect a woman's right to 
have an abortion. Petitioners (herein-
after "Operation Rescue") were Op-
eration Rescue, an organization that 
opposed abortion, and six individuals 
who sought to protect the rights of the 
unbom by staging anti-abortion dem-
onstrations. 
In the United States District 
Court for the Eastem District of Vir-
ginia, Pro-Choice applied for a penna-
nent injunction to enjoin Operation Res-
cue from demonstrating and blocking 
the entrances of abortion clinics. The 
district court held that preventing a 
woman who sought an abortion or other 
abortion-related services from access-
ing an abortion clinic violated her con-
stitutional right of interstate travel un-
der 42 U.s.c. § 1985(3) (1988). In so 
holding, the court granted the injunc-
tion and ruled in favor of Pro-Choice on 
its state law claims of nuisance and 
trespass. The Court of Appeals for the 
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Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. 
The United States Supreme 
Court began its analysis by reviewing 
two previously adjudicated cases 
wherein it established the required 
elements of a § \985(3) private con-
spiracy claim. First, a plaintiff must 
show "some racial, or perhaps other-
wise class-based, invidiously discrimi-
natory animus [was] behind the con-
spirators' action." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 
758 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403 U.S. 88,102 (1971». Second, the 
private conspiracy must have been 
"aimed at interfering with rights that 
are protected against private, as well as 
official encroaclunent." Bray, 113 S. 
Ct. at 758 (citing Carpenters v. Scott, 
463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983». 
As to the first element, the Court 
noted that it had never before had occa-
sion to define or set the parameters of 
what constituted a "perhaps otherwise 
class-based invidiously discriminatory 
animus." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759. 
Relying on the theory of stare decisis, 
Pro-Choice asserted that the animus 
behind the opposition to abortion was 
analogous with the intent to discrimi-
nate against a particular class of indi-
viduals, such as racial discrimination. 
The Court rejected such a correlation 
and the perceived conclusion of the 
district court that opposition to abor-
tion was considered discrimination 
against the "class" of women who 
sought abortions. ld. The Court noted 
whatever the exact meaning of "class" 
was under Gr~[fin 's expansive defini-
tion, the tenn undoubtedly indicated 
more than a class ofpeople who shared 
in a desire to participate in conduct that 
the § 1985(3) defendant disfavored. ld. 
Moreover, the Court stated that simply 
defining "class" as those who engaged 
in conduct with which the defendant 
interfered would permit an exorbitant 
amount of plaintiffs to bring a federal 
cause of action, and in essence, convert 
§ \985(3) into a general federal tort 
statute, something the animus require-
ment was implemented to prevent. ld. 
The Court recognized, how-
ever, that Pro-Choice's argument was 
not limited solely to women seeking 
abortions, for Pro-Choice alleged that 
class-based discrimination existed 
against women in general. ld. The 
Court declined to address whether 
women in general was a qualifying 
"class" under the Griffin definition 
because Operation Rescue's actions 
did not reflect an animus towards 
women "because they are women." Id. 
Rather, recognizing thatthe "animus" 
requirement does not mandate a finding 
of malicious motivation, the Court as-
serted that "at least a purpose that 
focusses upon women by reason of 
their sex" must be established. ld. Find-
ing that even that minimal requirement 
was not met, the Court stated the pur-
pose behind the demonstrations was the 
physical intervention between women 
seeking abortions and the unbom vic-
tims, not women as a class. Id. at 760. 
The Court after reaching the 
aforementioned conclusion stated for 
Pro-Choice to sustain its allegation that 
a discriminatory intent existed against 
women as a class, it must prove ei-
ther: (1) that it could reasonably be 
presumed that the opposition to abor-
tion reflected a sex-based intent, or (2) 
regardless of intent, that a class-based 
animus could be detemlined solely by 
the effect of the demonstrations. Id. at 
760. The Court found neither proposi-
tion could be supported. Id. 
Regarding the first proposition, 
the Court noted that certain activities 
incite great opposition, and if those 
activities were targeted and undertaken 
exclusively or predominantly by a spe-
cific class of individuals, an intent to 
discriminate against that class could be 
presumed. ld. The Court concluded, 
however, it was illogical to presume 
that the opposition to abortion was an 
opposition towards women in general 
because there are numerous common 
and refined reasons for opposing abor-
tion other than hatred towards women 
as a class. Id. The Court found because 
women and men are on both sides of the 
abortion issue, abortion protests were 
not divided along gender lines or geared 
towards women as a class. Jd. 
Holding that there was no sex-
based intent behind the demonstrations, 
the Court stated the success of Pro-
Choice's claim rested with the second 
proposition.ld. To succeed, the Court 
stated, Pro-Choice had to show that 
irrespective of Operation Rescue's in-
tent, there in effect existed a discrimina-
tory intent against women as a class 
because abortion is an undertaking en-
gaged in solely by women. Id. Citing 
two previously adjudicated cases, the 
Court held such a proposition was not 
supportable. Jd. 
In Geduldigv. Aiello, 417U.S. 
484 (1974), the Court held that because 
women only are able to bear children is 
not conclusive that every legislative 
classification concerning pregnancy was 
asex-basedclassification.ld. TheCourt 
reached a similar conclusion in Feeney 
v. Personnel Administrator of Mass., 
442 U.S. 256 (1979), wherein the Court 
held in order to establish that c1ass-
based discrimination existed under the 
Equal Protection Clause, it must be 
shown that a defendant chose or reaf-
firmed his course of action at least in 
part because of its adverse effects on 
the intended group. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 
760. The Court concluded that the 
Feeney principle was applicable to the 
"class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus" requirement of § 1985(3) 
because the Equal Protection Clause is 
inherent in the class-based animus re-
quirement. Moreover, it is particularly 
applicable because the Court had previ-
ously held that the disfavoring of abor-
tion was not "ipso facto" sex discrimi-
nation. ld. In so holding, the Court 
rejected the validity ofthe second propo-
sition. 
The Court, in further attempt-
ing to define the scope of the Griffin 
holding, next looked at the denotation 
given to the words "invidiously" and 
"discriminatory" in the context of 
"there must be some racial or perhaps 
otherwise class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus." Bray, 113 S. Ct. 
at 761 (citing Gr@n,403 U.S. at 102). 
The Court stated no matter what side of 
the fence one falls on the goal behind, 
the demonstrations did not deserve the 
harsh description and derogatory asso-
ciation which accompanies racism. ld. 
To hold that it did, the Court stated, 
would be contrary to its previous hold-
ing that electing childbirth over abor-
tion was proper and asensible reason to 
warrant the allocation of public funds. 
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474. 
This proposition would also further con-
flict with Congress' discrimination of 
abortion through its refusal to provide 
financial support to women seeking 
abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297,325. Bray, 113 S. C1. at 762. 
Finding that Pro-Choice failed 
to meet the Gr~[fin animus requirement, 
the Court addressed the second element 
of proving a § 1985(3) claim. The 
Court stated that in order to succeed on 
a § 1985(3) private conspiracy claim, 
the claimant must prove that there was 
an intent to deprive a person of a right 
guaranteed against private impairment. 
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762 (citingCarpen-
ters, 463 U.S. at 883). The Court held 
that no such motive existed for Opera-
tion Rescue's abortion protests. Bray, 
113 S. Ct. at 762. 
In making its argument, Pro-
Choice relied upon the constitutional 
right of interstate travel, which had in 
some contexts been held to be protected 
against private interference, as grounds 
for establishing the existence of a § 
1985(3) private conspiracy. The Court 
held the fact that a considerable amount 
of women travel across state lines to 
obtain an abortion, did not alone estab-
lish a connection between the demon-
strations and a woman's constitutional 
right to interstate travel. Bray, 113 S. 
Ct. at 762. Drawing upon the "invidi-
ously discriminatory animus" require-
ment of Griffin, the Court created a 
requirement for establishing a con-
spiracy. The claimant must prove that 
a person's actions were "aimed at," 
and not merely incidentally affecting a 
person's constitutionally protected right. 
Jd. In this case, the Court held this 
requirement was not met. In fact, the 
requirement could not conceivably be 
met because Pro-Life's opposition to 
abortion did not even remotely correlate 
to interstate travel. Rather, Operation 
Rescue solely opposed the act of abor-
tion, and it was irrelevant to them 
whether the abortion was performed 
after interstate travel. ld. at 763. 
Moreover, the Court also re-
jected Pro-Choice's constitution viola-
tion argument for a second, indepen-
dent reason. ld. The Court recognized 
that the constitutional right of interstate 
travel does not transforn1 a state tort 
into a federal offense simply because 
the act was directed against interstate 
travelers. Furthermore, the Court noted 
that the right to interstate travel pro-
tected travelers from the "erection of 
actual barriers" and "being treated dif-
ferently" when traveling across state 
lines. ld. In applying the aforemen-
tioned, the Court found the only barrier 
to movement as a result of the demon-
strations was at the abortion clinics 
which it concluded hindered exclusively 
intrastate travel. Jd. As such, the Court 
stated unless the restrictions were ap-
plied in a discriminating and intentional 
manner against citizens of other states 
there was no infringement on women's 
right of interstate travel. Jd. 
Pro-Choice also contended that 
the demonstrations infringed upon a 
woman's right to abortion. Jd. at 764. 
While the Court recognized that the 
right of abortion was undoubtedly 
"aimed at" by the demonstrations, the 
Court refused to acknowledge that a § 
1985 (3) claim existed. The Cou rt based 
its conclusion on its previous holding 
that § 1985(3) did not apply to private 
conspiracies which were "aimed at" a 
right protected solely against state in-
terference. Instead that section applied 
only to conspiracies which were aimed 
at rights protected against private, as 
well as official, interference. ld. In so 
holding, the Court noted there are only 
a handful of rights which are protected 
from both private and official interfer-
ence, such as the Thirteenth Amend-
ment rights of interstate travel and free-
dom from enslavement. As such, the 
Court refused to add the right of abor-
23.31U. BaIt. L.F. - 25 
tion'to that exclusive list especially in 
light of its earlier unwillingness to in-
clude the more explicitly protected con-
stitutional right of free speech. Id. 
In Bray, the United States Su-
preme Court clarified its current posi-
tion on abortion and in so doing, re-
jected Pro-Choice's latest attempt to 
permanently enjoin Pro-Life demonstra-
tors from blocking the entrances to abor-
tion clinics. The Court found there was 
no latent conspiracy against women as 
a class behind the demonstrations, and 
further refused to recognize that a 
woman's constitutionally protected 
right of interstate travel was infringed 
upon by such demonstrations. While 
this decision is an apparent victory for 
Operation Rescu~, the full impact of 
this decision may never materialize given 
the two recent shootings that injured 
one abortion doctor and killed another, 
coupled with the retirement of Justice 
White, who joined the majority in this 
opinion. 
- John M Oliveri 
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Georgia v. McCollum: CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS MAY NOT USE 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE 
BASIS OF RACE. 
In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. 
Ct. 2348 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that defendants in 
criminal cases may not use peremptory 
challenges to discriminate against po-
tentialjurors on the. basis ?frace. In so 
ruling, the Court expanded its prohibi-
tion of racially discriminatory uses of 
peremptory strikes beyond the State 
and private litigants to encompass crimi-
na defendants. 
On August 10, 1990, two caucasian 
defendants were charged with the ag-
gravated assault and simple battery of 
two African-Americans. Prior to jury 
selection, the prosecutor moved to pro-
hibit the respondents from using pe-
remptory challenges to discriminate 
against potential African-Americanju-
rors. Both the trial court and the Su-
preme Court of Georgia concluded that 
criminal defendants, unlike civil liti-
gants and criminal prosecutors, were 
pennitted to exercise peremptory strikes 
to racially discriminate, and thus keep 
African-Americans from serving on the 
jury. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to consider whether 
the prohibition against using peremp-
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory 
manner applied to criminal defendants, 
as well as to the State and civil litigants. 
The Court began its analysis by 
considering whether such use of pe-
remptory challenges by criminal defen-
dants inflicts the same harm on the juror 
and the conmmnity discussed in the 
Batson prohibition on discriminatory 
peremptory challenges by the prosecu-
tion. Id. at 2353 (citing Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986». In 
concluding that similar harm would arise 
from the use of racially discriminatory 
peremptory strikes by criminal defen-
dants, the Court noted that public dis-
crimination undermines public confi-
dence in the courts and the system as a 
whole. Id. at 2354. Furthermore, the 
Court stressed the importance of public 
trust in the judicial system to maintain 
peace in the community, especially in 
race-related cases. McCollum, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2354. Whether the discrimina-
tion was exercised by the State or the 
defense, the Court concluded that the 
resulting antagonistic feelings towards 
the justice system were the same. Id. 
The Court next addressed whether 
the use of peremptory challenges by 
criminal defendants constituted state 
action under the Equal Protection 
Clause, because state action is required 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
order to give rise to a Constitutional 
violation. Id. The Court first looked to 
its analysis in Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., III S. Ct. 2082 (1991), 
which inquired into whether strikes arose 
from a right or privilege of state author-
ity. McCollum, 112 S. C1. at 2354. 
Observing that both the right to exer-
cise the strikes and their scope were 
defined by state law, the Court deter-
mined that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges was a state right or privilege. Id. 
at 2355. 
The Court next considered whether 
the defendants could be viewed as state 
actors, so that their actions would be 
considered state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. The Court uti-
lized the three prong analysis estab-
lished in Edmonson which examined 
the following: (1) the extent to which 
the actor relied on governmental assis-
tance and benefits, (2) whether the actor 
was performing a traditional govern-
mental function, and (3) whether the 
in ju ry caused was aggravated in a unique 
way by the incidents of governmental 
authority. Id. (citing Edmonson, IllS. 
Ct. at 2083). 
Concluding that the defendants were 
state actors, the Court applied the three 
prong test and noted that the criminal 
defendants had substantially relied on 
governmental assistance and benefits. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355. In 
addition, the pervasive nature of the 
government's involrement in jury se-
lection through state statutes enabled 
the peremptory challenge system to ex-
